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Abstract—In a few short years the Internet of Things has
become an intrinsic part of everyday life, with connected devices
included in products created for homes, cars and even medical
equipment. But its rapid growth has created several security
problems, with respect to the transmission and storage of vast
amounts of customers data, across an insecure heterogeneous
collection of networks.
The Internet of Things is therefore creating a unique set of risk
and problems that will affect most households. From breaches in
confidentiality, which could allow users to be snooped on, through
to failures in integrity, which could lead to consumer data being
compromised; devices are presenting many security challenges
to which consumers are ill equipped to protect themselves from.
Moreover, when this is coupled with the heterogeneous nature
of the industry, and the interoperable and scalability problems
it becomes apparent that the Internet of Things has created an
increased attack surface from which security vulnerabilities may
be easily exploited.
However, it has been conjectured that blockchain may provide
a solution to the Internet of Things security and scalability
problems. Because of blockchain’s immutability, integrity and
scalability, it is possible that its architecture could be used for
the storage and transfer of Internet of Things data.
Within this paper a cross section of blockchain consensus
protocols have been assessed against a requirement framework,
to establish each consensus protocols strengths and weaknesses
with respect to their potential implementation in an Internet of
Things blockchain environment.
Index Terms—blockchain, iot, security, privacy, consensus
protocols
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a collection of physical
devices, such as home appliances, medical equipment and cars,
which contain software which allows them to monitor, collect
and actuators personal data across networks. Devices such as
smart speakers, smart cameras, smart monitors and even smart
cars, which possess the capability of communicating with each
other and/or us to provide information or to carry out orders
- with some devices even capable of autonomous decision
making. Yet, IoT data is regularly transmitted through poorly
protected, hostile networks where they can be snooped upon
or stolen. [1].
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In part this has been due to the fact that the IoT environment
is made up of a mesh of technologies which operate within a
conglomerate of protocols; and because of careless program
design, various IoT security issues are being created [2]. In ’A
Survey of Blockchain Security Issues and Challenges’ [1], it
was postulated that because of the heterogeneous structure of
IoT devices the protection of data had been made a complex
issue.
Thus, some of the main challenges that will be faced by
IoT devices will be data integrity security and scalability;
which leaves the IoT landscape, in need of a novel and unique
solution to its problems. [3] [4].
This fact was confirmed by Hewlett Packard, in their
Internet of Things Research Study, 1. In this report various
IoT security violations were identified. In particular it was
established that 80 % of IoT devices were failing to implement
secure passwords; and a further 60 % of devices were failing
to encrypt users’ data. It thus seems apparent that the IoT
environment would benefit from a uniform framework with
respect to its assessment of a device’s security requirements
[5]. Moreover, it has been theorised that blockchain, the archi-
tecture behind cryptocurrency, when combined with the correct
consensus protocol may provide a solution to the problem.
Insofar as , it is possible that it could provide IoT devices’
with integrity, scalability and immutable while operating in a
data intense environment.
This paper will therefore, attempt to identify IoT vulnerabil-
ities and requirements. Next it will assess various blockchain
architecture and consensus protocols against these require-
ments. In particularly this paper will:
1) Outline IoT security requirements;
2) Outline the security mechanisms that will be needed to
facilitate these requirement;
3) Provide a framework for cataloguing a consensus proto-
cols, compliance with these requirements;
4) And finally, drawing up an assessment of blockchain
consensus protocols for the Internet of Things in accor-
1HP Internet of Things research study, http://www8.hp.com 2018 ac-
cessed online
dance to IoT requirements and mechanisms.
This paper is structured as follows: section I contains the
Introduction to the problem; in section II the Background
is given; section III contains IoT Requirements; section IV
contains Services and Mechanisms; Assessments Criteria is in
section V and Conclusion is in VI.
II. BACKGROUND
A. IoT
IoT refers to numerous physical objects - 20 billion by
2020, according to Gartner [6] [4]. It encompasses technolo-
gies and nodes which are responsible for smart grids, power
plants, smart homes, intelligent transportation and smart cities.
Devices which are designed to provide ambient intelligent
computing.
A burgeoning peer-to-peer network of distributed indepen-
dently operable things, that are equipped to:
• Sense their environment;
• Gather data;
• Forward data;
• Receive data.
IoT networks, transmit and receive data that is sensitive to
their users, across a variety of network devices. But many of
these networks are unsafe and when this is coupled with the
fact that up to 80 % of IoT devices fail to implement basic
security [7], it becomes apparent that an interoperable security
solution to IoT’s requirement is necessary.
B. Blockchain
Blockchain is a major area of interest within the computing,
information security and FinTec fields. Due to its potential
immutability and its ability to detect integrity violations, along
with its other security properties, it is possible that blockchain
could be of interest to the IoT industry. [8].
A Blockchain is created by chaining together blocks of
transactional data, to create a ledger. A blockchain may contain
one or more ledgers, which could be relevant to one or
more organisation. Digital signatures are also used by many
blockchain architectures, to authenticate each transaction.
A chain is made up of several individual blocks, which are
joined together. Each individual block consist of two parts, the
block header and the block body. The block header includes:
1) Parent block hash, (256 bit hash value that points to the
parent of the block);
2) Merkle root hash, (the hash value of all the blocks in
the chain);
3) A time stamp;
4) A nonce, (a 4 byte use once unique identifier).
The Ledger is a distributed ledger, which is used to record
transactions [9]; it is also the mechanism behind cryptocur-
rency.
In general its architecture is designed to fit one of two
structures: private permissioned or public permissionless. A
private ledger is owned by a centralised organisation. It is a
permissioned ledger where all usage, processing, management
and recording of transactions are done by authorised parties.
A permissioned ledger may be representative of the transac-
tion of a single organisation, or it may be representative of
the transaction of an umbrella company, under which many
organisation may operate, (e.g.: Ethereum).
The consensus protocol. The Purpose of a blockchain
consensus protocols is that it provide a method for the
recording and validation of transactions that take place in the
distributed network. It is the authentication algorithm which
is used to check the completeness and correctness of each
blockchain transaction, before the transaction is committed to
the chain. For a consensus protocol to be affective it must be
difficult to replicate, duplicate or appropriate a transaction. It
must therefore, contain mechanism for securing its self from
miscreant activities. A consensus protocol is the fundamental
part of blockchain technology, which provides validation and
security for the data contained in a blockchain ledger.
Some consensus protocols require a numerically challenging
equation to be completed before a block is committed to the
chain. Blocks are then mathematically hashed to each other
and it is this chaining process that gives some blockchains their
immutable quality. Fundamentally, the consensus protocol is
responsible for ensuring the contents of each block is valid.
Blockchain consensus protocols may be placed in to one of
two groups, quorum or deterministic. Quorum algorithms (e.g.:
proof of work) are based on a resources intensive analytical
behaviour, with regards to choosing the transaction analyst
and agreeing on a block’s validity. Whereas, a deterministic
algorithm uses pseudo-randomness to identifying an analyst
and to agreeing on various block issues (e.g.: proof of luck).
One of the main problems associated with many consen-
sus protocols, which are used by cryptocurrency and thus
blockchain, is the requirement that all analyst participate
in their consensus [10]. Due to this fact, many blockchain
environment are cumbersome and resource intensive.
In an attempt to rectify this, resource issue, many more
consensus protocols have been designed and proposed by
individuals and various organisations. Yet many of these have
not been subject to peer review and others, while asserting the
qualities of their consensus protocols, fail to provide detailed
algorithmic information.
The industry’s attempt to rectify the resources issues, how-
ever, has of late seen many more incantation of quorum
based protocols being proposed. These new breed of consensus
algorithms are, often coupled with a secure chip architecture
(e.g.: proof of luck and Intel SGX), which is intended to
provide an extra layer of security while reducing the resources
scalability problem.
Digital Signature are used by many blockchains as a means
of authenticating transactions and validating a users transaction
before it is placed in a block, (digital signature are based on the
Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm. It is used in protocols
such as SSL, TLS and IPsec VPN). The algorithm uses a
public and private key pair, which can be used to allows a
shared secret to be passed between two parties or to validate
a transaction. Digital signature’s authentication and validation
stages are thus:
1) Bob a blockchain user, is issued with a private and public
key - digital signature;
2) Bob keeps his private keys secret, but he issues his
public key to other users and blockchain analysts;
3) Bob instigates a transaction;
4) Bob then takes a hash of the transaction and encrypt the
hash with his private key;
5) Bob appends the encrypted hash to the transaction - i.e.
the hash is his signature;
6) Alice, a blockchain analysts, receives Bob’s transaction,
with the encrypted hash;
7) Alice then uses Bob’s public key to decrypt the hash;
8) Alice compares data - if the decrypted transaction data
and the actual transaction data are the same, authenticate
and validation has been achieved.
C. Security Issues
Depending on the chosen consensus protocol, a blockchain
may suffer from several security issues [1], some of which
are:
• 51% attack. Consensus protocols that uses a quorum
method for the agreement of transactions are susceptible
to this type of attack. The 51% attack occurs when a
group of miscreant analyst take control of more than 50%
of a network. Thereafter, they would be able to control
all network transactions. [11];
• Double fork. The double fork attack is effective when
applied to blockchain environments in which the total
value of a chain is used as an indicator of the validity
of chain. The double fork attack occurs when miscreants
create two chains which are equidistant from the genesis,
with an equal number of transaction. A decision on the
dominant chain is based on the value of each chain. [1];
• Double spend. The double spend attacks is effective
because it exploits the spending and authorisation lag
time that exists in most blockchain environment. A
transaction is created that moves funds to a merchant
address. Once the transaction is entered into the current
block, possession of the goods is taken. But before the
block is authorised a second transaction, relating to the
same monies is created. The double spend attack can
be due to either erroneous or fraudulent behaviour. All
blockchains that use a distributed single ledger structure
are susceptible to this attack. [1];
• Scaling problem. The scaling problem can manifest itself
in one of two ways. Firstly, it could be caused by the
high level of resources utilisation that occurs with some
consensus protocols; or secondly, it may refer to network
latency, which is due to the Maximum Transmission Unit
(MTU) of IoT device. Which in turn could lead to packet
storms. Bitcoin is susceptible to a resources scalability
problem, because of its uses of Proof of Work (PoW).
[1];
• Sybil attack. This occurs when identities are forged, and
a networks reputation is undermined. The sybil attack is
only affective if a blockchain environment fails to use
integrity and authorisation security mechanisms. [12] ;
• Eclipse attack. For this attack to work your surrounding
peers must be both malicious and in cahoots with each
other. They then work together to prevent you from being
well connected to the network. You are thereafter, ill-
equipped to verify transactions. The revision attack is
only affective if a blockchain environment fails to use
immutability. [13].
• Revision Attack. This is when data that has already been
authenticated and added to the chain, is amended at a later
date. The revision attack is only effective if a blockchain
environment fails to use immutability.
It is therefore important to ensure that the blockchain,
consensus protocol mitigate or removes a potential attack.
In part this may be achieved by the inclusion of the correct
security mechanism.
D.
In order to provide transaction data flow from the IoT
device to the consensus protocol, it will be necessary to use
a blockchain architecture that facilitates the seamless and
scalable movement of data. [14]. Such a blockchain would
therefore need to possess the following key properties:
• Decentralization;
• Transaction Speed;
• Security;
• Scalability;
• Anonymity (pseudo-anonymity);
• Auditability;
• Efficiency;
• Immutability.
Although, it should be noted that some of these properties
will be dependent on the blockchain consensus protocol.
This assessment looked at the following blockchain archi-
tectures so as to assess whether they met the requirements of
an IoT environment: Ethereum - because it is a well developed
blockchain environments that uses smart contracts; Corda
- because its a prominent financial blockchain environment
which was designed to uses smart contracts; Hyperledger
ledger - which is an umbrella organisation that includes several
blockchain smart contract designs, some of which are modular.
The aforementioned architectures were assessed against the
IoT blockchain requirements with respect to their potential
as architectural solutions to the IoT blockchain architectural
requirements.
Ethereum is a permissionless ledger, which initially used a
proof of work consensus protocol with respect to the ordering
and validity of a transaction; although, it is presently transiting
to casper, a proof of stake consensus protocol. It is a non-
modular smart contract platform, with a transaction block
speed of 12 seconds.
Moreover, it has been shown to contain security and ef-
ficiency issues at the solidity, Ethereum Virtual Machine
(EVM) and blockchain levels [15] which are compromising
its immutability, efficiency, auditability and security.
Corda was designed by the financial industry, for the
financial industry. It is a permissioned private smart contract
platform, which combines smart contracts with smart legal
contracts. It uses a consensus of state validity, consensus
of state uniqueness and a notary with respect to transaction
authentication and validation. However, it is proprietary with
restricted data on its blockchain architecture and consensus
protocol being available. It also has not been subjected to peer
review, with respect to its efficiency and security [16].
Hyperledger 2 is a collective name used by a collection
of blockchain solutions offered up by the Linux Foundation.
Under the umbrella of Hyperledger five blockchain solutions
have been created.
• Burrow
• Fabric
• Iroha
• Sawtooth
• Indy
After reviewing the aforementioned, four were considered
to be at a sufficient enough development stage to be of interest.
These being: Sawtooth, Iroha, Burrow and Fabric.
Sawtooth Sawtooth [17] is a blockchain ledger that has
been published by Intel under the umbrella of the Linux
Foundation. The blockchain can be used over a permission or
permissionless environment. It has been designed to be used
in industries who require a blockchain mechanism to facilitate
their transaction data storage and transmission. In regards to
its consensus protocol it uses a lottery protocol and a Proof
of Elapsed Time (PoET), which uses the provision contained
within the TEE (trusted execution environment) [18] of the
Intel SGX [19] processor to instigate and manage its consensus
protocol.
Whereas, the ledger’s ability to handle transaction data ap-
pears to meet some of the requirements of an IoT environment,
its architectural design has been discounted on the grounds that
it was not possible to find algorithmic details of the consensus
protocol, PoET. However, as this transaction ledger is still in
its development phase, further consideration maybe given to
it at a later time.
Iroha Iroha [20] uses C++ to provide ledger capabilities
for mobile and web development projects. Within the Iroha
environment Hyperledger blockchain can store two types of
data objects and functions. It is therefore an object orientated
environment, and as such it could meet the needs of IoT
devices. The server validation system was able to perform
the following checks on each activity: Data throughput test; a
version test; a computational test; and a data consistency test.
Once again, this was still at an early stage and little to
no information was given on its consensus algorithm. It is
therefore a project that may require further consideration, at a
later stage in its development cycle.
2Linux foundation, Hyperledger http://hyperledger.org
Burrow At the time of carrying out this assessment, the
Burrows blockchain environment was still at its incubation
stage. As a consequent of this it was difficult to obtain
technical details.
However, a review of available data indicated that Burrow
would be based on the smart contract model, with many of
the technical qualities associated with Ethereum.
Moreover, with little to no information on its technical
schematics, it was not possible to carry out an in-depth
technical review of this blockchain model.
Fabric Fabric is a modular pluggable architecture, which
can be changed in accordance to a user’s requirements. It also
provides its user with access to a certification authority and
it facilitates public / private encryption and digital signature.
But, PBFT and Kafka are the consensus protocols that are
being used by Fabric, and as it will be demonstrated in section
V, both of these fall short of IoT’s requisites. However, it
should also be noted that due to the pluggable nature of Fabric,
these consensus protocols could either be substituted out, or a
mitigating technical architecture could be put in place.
III. IOT REQUIREMENTS
During the product development life cycle, often the security
development life cycle is omitted, and as it is often shown
this is invariably to the detriment of the product. Yet this
situation is avoidable. By identifying the security requirements
of a product, alongside its technical requirements, it may be
possible that the correct mechanisms could be put in place,
which would have mitigated many present day IoT security
vulnerabilities. Moreover, the application of this approach is
demonstrated by the Microsoft Development Security, Life
Cycle; an approach which incorporate security and privacy
consideration at every stage of the development life cycle. 3
In this vain, it is the intent of this assessment to identify
IoT’s security and service requirements and their implemen-
tation methods.
With respect to IoT services requirements, several frame-
works and models were reviewed, in an attempt to identify an
applicable structure for an IoT consensus protocol structure.
In particular the:
• CIA triad
• Parkerian Hexad
• ISO 7498-2
were referenced because of their importance with respect to
network security and application security.
However, after reviewing Parkerian Hexad it was establish
that only two of its six elements were applicable to an IoT
consensus protocol, (see table one for the IoT consensus
protocol requirements), i.e. integrity and authenticity.
In the case of the CIA triad, only integrity was found to be
relevant.
ISO 7498-2 was, however with respect to this review,
found to be sufficient with respect to its range of security
requirements.
3https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/securityengineering/sdl/
IV. SERVICES AND MECHANISMS
The term services [21], as used by this report, was first
defined by ISO 7498 to mean the security goals of an appli-
cation. This report has, however, expanded this definition to
include the overall goals of an application, that is: security
and functionality.
The term security mechanisms [21], as used by this report,
was defined by ISO 7498 to mean the way in which a service
goal would be achieved.
The term requirements, as used in this paper, will refer to the
combination of an IoT’s service and mechanism requirements.
The review classification will therefore be based on an IoT’s
services and mechanisms requirements.
A. Security Services and Mechanisms
As outlined by ISO 7498 there are five categories of security
services, but only four security services are relevant to this
research, these being:
Authentication, this can be split into: Entity authentication
- ensuring the person you are communicating with is the
person you intend to be communicating with; data origin
authentication - ensuring the data you receive is complete and
correct.
Authentication, in all its guises, is important to IoT, insofar
as, it is a service which provides assurance with respect to the
person from whom you receive data and the data itself.
Data Integrity, preventing an unauthorised entity from
carrying out unauthorised changes or destruction of data is
achieved by the implementation of an data integrity mecha-
nism.
The integrity of each blockchain transaction should be veri-
fiable and accountable; Therefore, data integrity is a desirable
goal.
Non-Repudiation, preventing an entity from denying they
took a specific action is achieved by the instigation of a non-
repudiation mechanism.
In line with the transactional nature of blockchain non-
repudiation should be considered a fundamental security goal.
As stated above a security mechanism is a means by which
a security service may be implemented. ISO 7498 identified
eight mechanisms but only six are relevant to the overall
IoT architecture and only two are relevant to the consensus
protocol. These being:
Encipherment, is a way of hiding information. it uses
mechanisms such as steganography and encryption. Encipher-
ment may also be subdivided into reversible and irreversible.
Due to the open nature of a ledger, it would not be
possible to encipher IoT data, at the application layer (i.e.
within the ledger). Although, at the physical and network
layer encipherment of transaction data would be necessary to
protect it against: a man in the middle attack, snooping and
eavesdropping.
A blockchain consensus protocol would therefore, not be
required to provide this security service.
Services Mechanisms
Entity Authentication Encipherment, Digital Signature
Data Origin Authentication Encipherment, Digital Signature
Data Integrity Encipherment
Non-repudiation Digital Signature
Immutability Auditability, Merkel Chain, Hash Mac
Scalability Resource Management
TABLE I
IOT SERVICES REQUIREMENTS AND MECHANISMS FRAMEWORK
Digital Signature, there are two parts to digital signature:
signing and verifying. A digital signature can provide: non-
repudiation; entity authentication and integrity which are IoT
requirements.
Access Control, relates to methods used to ensure only
authorised persons have access to data. However, due to the
open nature of a blockchain ledger, such a control would not be
needed at the application layer. Although, at the network layer
of a permissioned ledger, it is possible that some industries will
require an access control matrix.
Threfore, blockchain access control is outside the scope of
this paper.
Notarisation, is implemented by a third party, usually a
certification authority, who provides guarantees with respect
to data origin and integrity. it would therefore not be relevant
to the consensus protocol, but it would be relevant to the
blockchain architecture.
It is also worth noting that security mechanisms may take
the form of either a specific security mechanism or a pervasive
security mechanism. A pervasive mechanism is a mechanism
that is not mutually inclusive to a single security service.
Whereas, a specific security mechanism is one that is relevant
to a specific security service.
Consensus protocols will be assessed with respect to both
their pervasive and specific mechanisms.
B. Immutability
It should be noted that, a security service that was not
mentioned in ISO 7498 is immutability, a service that is
important to IoT. Immutability relates to the requirement that
it should be impossible / difficult to change a blockchain;
from the genesis block to the present block; the contents
of a blockchain, once verified, should be constant and fixed.
As this is a fundamental blockchain mechanism it should be
considered in an assessment.
In conclusion for an IoT consensus protocol to be con-
sidered secure it must include mechanism which provide:
authentication; integrity; non-repudiation and immutability.
C. Technical Requirements
The Internet of Things has been described as a paradigm
that is gaining control within the world [22]. Yet, its re-
quirements have not, as yet been standardized; which has led
to vulnerabilities and operability issues. In ’The Internet of
Things: A Survey’ [22], it was highlighted that security issues
relating to integrity, anonymity and adaptability / scalability
were blockchain’s main areas of concern. These concerns have
been echoed in several other papers [2] [23].
The Open Web Application Security Project [24] has also
confirmed the top vulnerabilities that are facing IoT as being:
Insecure Interface; Insufficient Authentication/Authorisation;
Insecure Network Services; Lack of Transport Encryption;
Privacy Concerns; Insecure Software/Firmware; and, Poor
Physical Security, which is in line with earlier summation.
In The Computer for the 21st Century [25], it was also
proposed that ubiquitous computing should have three main
services, which must first be met, if IoT is to become an
invisible ambient intelligence [26], these being: cost, power
consumption and networking capability, i.e. scalability.
As of 2014 Bitcoin electricity consumption was on par with
Ireland’s electricity usage [27] and it has been predicted that
bitcoin will will be consuming approximately 0.5 % of the
worlds energy by the end of 2018, (as cited in 2018 [28]).
Scalability would therefore be considered a fundamental IoT
requirement.
IoT’s requirements were further explored by Zhi-Kai Zhang
et al [2]; in this paper the security concerns affecting IoT
devices and networks, which were defined as:
• Identification and location method problems;
• Authentication and authorisation methods need to be
established;
• Storage and memory restrictions data privacy;
• Malware vulnerability; privacy;
• Software vulnerability;
• and IoT malware.
Threfore, it has also been established that scalability should
also be considered a requirement.
V. ASSESSMENT CRITERIA
A. Framework
Entity Authentication objective: Mechanism should be
put in place which ensures the person you are talking to is
the person you intend to be communicating with. Purpose:
Protecting data from unauthorised access and unauthorised
changes.
Non-repudiation objective: Data verification mechanism
should be implemented Purpose: Preventing an entity from
denying they took a specific action.
Data Integrity objective A System for verifying each
blockchain transaction should be in place Purpose: To prevent
an authorised entity from carrying out authorised action.
Immutability objective Once data is committed to a chain
it should impossible or computationally difficult to change said
data. Purpose Provides a fixed completeness of data.
Scalability objective Use of these security instruments
should have limited and/or no impact on service. Purpose To
ensure implementation, these security requirements should not
have a significant impact on service provision.
B. Proof of Work PoW
In 1993 Cynthia Dwork and Moni Naor (as cited in [29]
) came up with the first proof of work concept. However, it
wasn’t until 1999 when Markus Jakobsson and Ari Juels [29]
coined the term Proof of Work [30] in their paper, ’Proof of
work and Bread pudding’ protocols. PoW is a protocol which
requires a resource intensive level of work from a miner, with
respect to authentication, verification and commitment of a
transaction. Used by Bitcoin, it is a decentralised, permission-
less network with the blockchain being replicated on multiple
nodes, throughout the network.
It uses Diffie Hellmen public / private key pairs for both
the authentication of a user, and the verification of their
transactions. Users sign all of their transactions with their
private key and minors uses public key to authenticate relevant
transaction. It is a quorum-based consensus protocol, in that
all minors have to agree on the validity of each transaction,
before a transaction can be added to a chain.
The header of each new block contains:
• The previous block hash, which when combined with the
Merkle chain gives the chain Integrity;
• A difficulty requirement. The blocks header is hashed by
the use of a hash algorithm, usually sha-256, the hash
output string must also meet a formatting requirement
that it contains a specific number of leading zeros, (at the
time of writing this paper the requirement was 18). This
feature gives PoW its immutability quality, although it is
also responsible for its resource usages scalability issues,
as minors hash and rehash each block, in an attempt to
meet this requirement [8].
• A nonce, which is a pseudo-random number which is
used to protect against a reply attack and/or changes to
the data. It therefore, provides PoW with data integrity.
• The previous blocks hash.
PoW consensus protocol is also theoretically susceptible to:
51 percent attack, scaling problem; Sybil attack; eclipse attack
and the double fork attack.
C. Proof of Stake
PoS [31] was created as an alternative to PoW. Very much
like PoW it is a distributed network consensus protocol which
is based on quorum agreement. However, with PoS the values
of a miner’s vote is directly proportionate to the number of
coins a miner owns; (i.e. If Bob owns 100 coins and Alice
owns 10 coin, then the value of Alice’s vote, in the quorum,
would be ten times less than that of Bob’s).
The formula is made more complex by the inclusion of
coin age. The age of a coin is defined as the amount of time
a currency has been held, multiplied by the value of the coin;
(e.g. if bob received 10 coins from Alice and he holds them
for 90 days, it would be said that Bob had accumulated coin
age of 900 days). Coin age increase the value of a miner’s
quorum vote. Coin age is also used to:
• Establish coin ownership, (miners are given voting incen-
tives if they own their coins for a long time);
• Decide a dominate fork (i.e.: a dominate fork is the one
with the greatest coin value with respect to miners’ votes);
• Decide which miner will be responsible for transaction
processing (i.e. the miner with the greatest coin age, is
always chosen as the miner responsible for transaction
processing).
Like PoW, PoS uses a private / public encryption algorithm,
with respect to the authentication and validation of a user’s
transaction. However, due to the structure of PoS quorum
algorithm, PoS blockchains do not provide immutability. PoS
is also susceptible revision attack, since the energy and cost
requirement for revising a chain is not prohibitive and the
double spend attack [32].
Finally, coin ownership is not indicative of an individual’s
vested interest in the efficient functionality of the consensus
protocol [33]; its usage could therefore lead to nothing at
stake (NoS), whereby minors who are only interested in
accumulating coins, may make decisions which could lead to
erroneous action with respect to the ledger.
D. Proof of Luck Consensus Protocol
Proof of Luck Consensus Protocol [8] consists of three
parts: proof of ownership; proof of time; and proof of owner.
Proof of ownership uses the Intel SGX, ( a hardware solution),
to provide each analyst with a unique ID, known as EPID.
This protects analyst from Sybil attacks and thereby provides
analysts with data integrity. By using the Intel SGX Trusted
Execution Environment,(TEE) it is possible for proof of time
to enforce, a bitcoin like, proof of work requirement, (i.e. that
a sufficient amount of time has passed before a new block may
be processed). This protects against the double spend attack.
The combination of the protocols and hardware and soft-
ware allows proof of luck to provide integrity. It also means the
consensus protocol has low latency with respect to transaction
validation which makes it scalable.
Intel SGX also includes a random number generator, which
allows the consensus protocol to carry out random miner
selection. [31] [34] However, it was not possible to ascertain
whether a digital signature was to be used with respect to
clients’ and their transaction; therefore it was not possible
to establish whether entity authentication and data origin
authentication could be achieved.
It also failed to provide information on how it would achieve
non-repudiation and immutability.
Due to limited data it was only possible to establish that PoL
appears to be susceptible to the revision attack. It should also
be noted that the Intel SGX does come with its own security
concerns. [35] [19] [34] In particular:
• DRAM bus tapping attack;
• Memory mapping attack;
• Software attacks on peripherals.
E. Kafka
Kafka was developed by LinkedIn [36] as a way of pro-
viding transaction scalability. It is a commitment log which
is replicated across a distributed network. It is capable of
processing between 5,000 and 50,000 queries per second;
while suffering little latency. Hyperledger Fabric is also using
it as a consensus protocol. Kafka messages (transactions) are
distributed by producer nodes, to its subscribed consumer
Services Consensus
Entity Authenti-
cation
PoW, PoS
Data Origin Au-
thentication
PoL, PoW, PoS
Data Integrity Pos, PoW, PoL, Kafka
Non-repudiation PoW, PoS
Immutability PoW
Scalability PoS, PoL, kafka, PBFT
TABLE II
IOT SERVICES SECURIRTY REQUIREMENTS AND CONSENSUS PROTOCOLS
nodes (channels). Consumer nodes are consumer groups that
are responsible for running a single consumer message pro-
cess. Consumer processes are assigned a partition. Messages
are held by Kafka’s commitment log, for a pre-determine
time. During this time period message deletion or amendments
are not permitted. Kafka therefore has a limited level of
immutable. Kafka uses a cache replication system, to preserve
the integrity of its data. It partitions are replicated among
replication servers known as brokers. Brokers therefore, guar-
antee limited data integrity; i.e. during the data retention
period. Moreover, Kafka was designed as a fault tolerant
scalable ordering system, distributed messaging system for log
processing. Its replication system provides system redundancy,
which enables it to provide fault tolerance. But it does not
provide: entity authentication; data origin authentication; non-
repudiation and immutability. Kafka’s processes are, however,
scalable.
F. PBFT
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance protocol [30] uses a
combination of primary backup and quorum replication tech-
niques to order requests. Initially designed as a means of
dealing with byzantine computer memory failure, in the last
five years, it has been adapted to be used as a consensus
protocol. A PBFT network is managed by a leader node, who
is responsible for decision making, based on quorum voting.
Within a window of vulnerability, (which relates to the time
between replication backups). PBFT is cable of functioning
even if a third of the nodes are acting malicious. Node leaders
are responsible for receiving requests from clients. Leader
node multicast (broadcast) these request to their peer nodes.
Once a request is actioned and a third of peer nodes have
confirmed the same result, the result is then accepted as the
result of the operation. Leader nodes then communicate the
result to the client. PBFT has been designed to be used within
a permissioned network. Moreover, it does not use any of the
traditional security protocols to protect clients and their data
and Its security mechanisms, appear to be undocumented. It
was therefore not possible to assess its consensus protocol
against the IoT’s framework.
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the last decade there has been a large-scale role out
of various IoT devices. But many of these devices have weak
passwords, insecure networks, a lack of operability and scaling
problems. Yet, the IoT industry continues to rapidly grow,
while failing to deal with its fundamental security issues.
However, if a reoccurrence of previous technological security
failures is to be prevented, IoT will require robust security
frameworks and standards. Moreover, it has been conjectured
that blockchain may provide a solution.
In this paper it was established that IoT security require-
ments for: entity authentication; data original authentication;
data integrity; non-repudiation; immutability and scalability,
could in part, be provided by blockchains immutability, con-
fidentiality, integrity and authorisation mechanisms. However,
at present no blockchain and consensus protocol could simul-
taneously meet both the security and scalability requirements.
Finally, the failure to resolve this issue continues to expose
the IoT environment to potential miscreant activities. Further
research will therefore need to be carried out into design a
secure and scalable IoT consensus protocol.
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